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Economic Perspective 1 
THE TAKEOVER BATTLE FOR BRITISH SUGAR 
by Robin Alpine 
Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
Throughout 1986 l i n e s for a t akeover 
b a t t l e for Br i t a in ' s producer of domestic 
bee t sugar have been drawn and redrawn. 
The cases of two p o t e n t i a l s u i t o r s a r e 
current ly being examined by the Monopolies 
a n d M e r g e r s C o m m i s s i o n (MMC). 
This Perspective examines the background 
to the f ight to control the production of 
h a l f of B r i t a i n ' s s u g a r and l o o k s in 
p a r t i c u l a r a t i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s fo r t h e 
survival of Greenock's sole remaining cane 
ref inery, Westburn. 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IH THE UK SUGAR 
MARKET 
For over s i x t y yea r s the r e f i n i n g of 
imported raw cane sugar has cc—existed in 
B r i t a i n w i t h t h e p r o c e s s i n g of 
domestically grown sugar beet , making the 
UK one of the few c o u n t r i e s in t h e world 
heavily involved in both major aspects of 
s u g a r p r o d u c t i o n . S i n c e t h e 1920s 
f a r m e r s , mainly in sou the rn and e a s t e r n 
England, have been encouraged t o grow 
sugar beet in order to guarantee a minimum 
l e v e l of domes t ic sugar needs . In 1936 
the eighteen beet f ac to r i e s then operating 
were merged i n t o a s i n g l e u n i t , t h e 
Br i t i sh Sugar Corporation (BSC), in which 
t h e G o v e r n m e n t t o o k a m i n o r i t y 
s h a r e h o l d i n g . The cane r e f i n e r s were 
forced t o r e l i n q u i s h t h e i r i n t e r e s t s in 
beet-sugar production and, conversely the 
beet sugar processors were not allowed to 
re f ine cane sugar. 
Prior to our jo ining the EEC, the UK sugar 
i n d u s t r y of t h e p o s t - w a r p e r i o d was 
largely control led by the 1956 Sugar Act. 
T h i s aimed a t e n a b l i n g Government 
commitments t o both Commonwealth suppl iers 
of raw cane sugar and Br i t i sh beet farmers 
to be compatible with a competitive market 
for sugar i t s e l f . The commitment to cane 
sugar suppl iers was enshrined in the 1951 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA), which 
guaranteed a marke t for some 1.74 long 
t o n s of raw sugar ( e q u i v a l e n t t o about 
1.66 m i l l i o n tonnes wh i t e sugar ) a t a 
p r i c e s e t annua l ly on the b a s i s of being 
r e a s o n a b l y r e m u n e r a t i v e t o e f f i c i e n t 
producers. 
The importance of t h i s arrangement t o the 
Commonwealth p roducers was s u b s t a n t i a l . 
The world sugar market has for a long time 
t a k e n t h r e e f o r m s : c o n s u m p t i o n of 
d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t i o n , e x p o r t under 
p re fe ren t ia l Special Agreements, and non-
preferent ia l t rade in a r e l a t i ve ly small , 
r e s i d u a l world market . P r i c e in t h i s 
r e s i d u a l market has f r e q u e n t l y moved as 
follows: several years of s t a b i l i t y a t a 
low l e v e l , a s h o r t very sharp i n c r e a s e 
brought about by supply problems such as 
bad h a r v e s t s , f o l l o w e d by an e q u a l l y 
d rama t i c f a l l as new c a p a c i t y induced by 
the price increase adds i t s output t o the 
normal o u t p u t , now r e s t o r e d , of e x i s t i n g 
c a p a c i t y . In a t y p i c a l year t h e world 
market p r i c e i s too low t o cover average 
c o s t s of even e f f i c i e n t p r o d u c e r s . 
Expor t ing c o u n t r i e s have t h u s r e l i e d on 
more generous p r e f e r e n t i a l a r rangements 
(known as Special Agreements), such as the 
CSA. 
UK en t ry t o the EEC in the e a r l y 1970s 
t h r e a t e n e d t o upse t t h i s a r rangement . 
Continental Europe was the cradle for the 
world bee t sugar i n d u s t r y , developed in 
the e a r l y n i n e t e e n t h cen tu ry . I t was 
t h u s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e EEC in t h e 
1960s developed a Sugar Regime which was 
based on beet sugar as the mainstay of i t s 
sugar needs. Impor t s would be l a r g e l y 
e l i m i n a t e d t h r o u g h t h e s e t t i n g of a 
Threshold P r i c e a t a l e v e l h igher than 
domestic production costs whi l s t domestic 
o u t p u t b e h i n d t h i s s h i e l d would be 
r e s t r i c t e d by means of m u l t i - t i e r e d 
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quotas. 
The system was much more successful in 
controlling imports than domestic output. 
By 1971/72 there was an excess in EEC 
production over consumption of 1.7 million 
tonnes (a self sufficiency ratio of 127%). 
B r i t a i n ' s proposed entry was thus a 
tempting ta rge t for EEC producers of 
surplus sugar. Hard bargaining in 1971, 
however, managed to secure the pa r t i a l 
retention of the exist ing market for 
Commonwealth suppliers of cane raws for a 
temporary period until mid-1975, the only 
loser being Australia whose quota was cut 
to zero. 
This s i tua t ion was put on a permanent 
footing a t a series of negotiations during 
1973 and 1974 which produced a Sugar 
Protocol, to the Lome Convention, to cover 
raw sugar imports from those African, 
Caribbean and Pac i f i c (ACP) s t a t e s 
associated with the EEC. The conflicting 
in t e re s t s of the Continental beet sugar 
and Commonwealth cane sugar producers were 
temporarily blunted by dramatic events in 
la te 1974 which saw the world market price 
soar fivefold. The familiar response 
followed as both cane and beet producers 
saw opportunities to expand; the EEC beet 
sugar quotas, for example, were raised a l l 
round. The scene was thus set for future 
trouble when the world moved back into 
sugar surplus, as in order to secure entry 
for the i r sugar into the EEC, the ACP 
c o u n t r i e s agreed not to oppose the 
exporting of surplus EEC beet sugar to the 
world market. 
THE EFFECT OF EiTRT TO THE EEC OM THE 
STRUCTURE OF THE UK SUGAR INDUSTRY 
In 1973 annual cane refining capacity in 
the UK was over 2 million tonnes of sugar. 
By contrast BSC was res t r ic ted under the 
1956 Sugar Act to around 650 thousand 
tonnes of refined sugar; the quali ty of 
raw beet sugar produced above th i s level 
was sent to the cane refiners for further 
p rocess ing . Beet y i e ld s had not , 
however, remained s t a t i c : in the 1960s 
yields were roughly 25% higher than in the 
1950s. Even without UK entry to the EEC, 
pressure to ra i se domestic beet sugar's 
share in t o t a l UK output was building up. 
EEC entry acted as the catalyst to bring 
this about; Britain was given an in i t ia l 
beet sugar quota of 990 thousand tonnes 
for 1974/75 based on i t s production in the 
early 1970s. At the same time raw cane 
sugar imports were cut by over 300 
thousand tonnes (Australia's quota). 
The potential for beet's share in UK sugar 
production doubled overnight from under 
25? to almost 50%. Bri ta in 's beet sugar 
production quota for the mid-1970s of 
around 1.3 million tonnes encouraged BSC 
to embark on a f ive -yea r expansion 
programme designed to almost double 
refined sugar capacity to 1.25 mill ion 
tonnes. 
The cane ref iners were h i t not only in 
relation to quantity; the financial margin 
available to them for the i r refining 
operations was now determined within an 
EEC Sugar Regime which was not designed to 
deal with th i s method of sugar making. 
The production of refined beet sugar i s 
essentially a one-stage operation so that 
there i s no real basis , within the beet 
regime, for costing the processing of raw 
sugar into refined sugar. The margin 
allowed by the difference between the 
Community price for refined sugar and the 
price agreed with the ACP countries for 
the i r raw sugar was to prove far l e s s 
adequate than the margin previously given 
to the cane refiners. 
S t r u c t u r a l changes in the UK sugar 
industry were inevi table . Their scale 
was, however, intensif ied by changes on 
the demand side. Throughout the 1960s 
and early 1970s annual total demand for UK 
sugar was close to 3 million tonnes: this 
included expor ts which accounted on 
average for around 10%. From 1975 
onwards demand f e l l sharp ly ; to 2.6 
million tonnes on average between 1975 and 
1978. Profi table export oportunit ies 
were reduced by the cut in the cane 
refining margin; whilst on the domestic 
front there was a two-pronged attack, 
induced largely by the dramatic price rise 
in 1974. Household buying for beverage 
sweetening declined sharply, no doubt 
supported also on health grounds, and 
indust r ia l users switched part of the i r 
sweetener demand to a l ternat ives such as 
glucose. 
Ca lcu la t ions made in the mid-1970s 
suggested that a viable cane refining 
industry required capacity of less than 
1.5 million tonnes. As a f i r s t s tep, 
Tate & Lyle (T&L) - with Government 
approval - acquired the only other cane 
ref iner , Manbre & Carton, in l a t e 1976. 
Two refineries were closed and another was 
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reduced substantially in size during 1977-
79. Trends on the domestic demand side, 
however, continued the i r decline and did 
not bottom out t i l l 1980 (at around 2.25 
million tonnes). Given the very limited 
opportunity for refined cane sugar export 
and the build-up in domestic beet sugar 
product ion to c lose to 1.25 m i l l i o n 
tonnes, further cane refinery closures 
became unavoidale. Two more refineries 
shut down between l a t e 1979 and 1981, 
reducing cane r e f i n i n g operations in 
Bri tain to two plants - the large Thames 
refinery (1 mill ion tonnes capacity) and 
the much smaller Westburn refinery in 
Greenock (150 thousand tonnes). 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUGAR MARKET 
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y BSC's p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
increased considerably under the EEC beet 
sugar biased regime. In 1980 i t became 
the subject of a takeover bid by S & W 
Ber i s fo rd . Ber is ford saw in BSC a 
manufacturing bus ines s which could 
usefu l ly complement t h e i r e x i s t i n g 
commodity t r a d i n g i n t e r e s t s (Thus 
spreading r i sks) but one which they f e l t 
they u n d e r s t o o d g iven t h e i r long 
experience as Br i t a in ' s la rges t sugar 
merchant. Because of B e r i s f o r d ' s 
distribituion role in the sale of both UK 
beet and cane sugar, the bid was referred 
to the MMC. Their report , published in 
march 1981, argued tha t "we find i t hard 
to identify any way in which the proposed 
merger is likely to operate positively for 
the public benefit". Nevertheless, i t 
concluded that provided Berisford ceased 
trading in T&L sugar products "the merger 
would have no effect on competition". In 
addit ion, i t argued tha t , i f Berisford 
were allowed to proceed with the takeover, 
BSC should be maintained as a separate 
subsidiary carrying on subs tant ia l ly as 
before in terms of i t s a c t i v i t i e s and 
published accounts . Ber is ford gave 
undertakings covering both these points 
and the takeover subsequently went ahead, 
with BSC renamed British Sugar (BS). 
Despi te the change in i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
arrangements which boosted UK beet sugar's 
market share close to 50? by 1980, the 
years since then have been f rus t ra t ing 
ones for BS. When agreement was finally 
reached in ea r ly 1981 for the EEC 
product ion quota period 1981/82 to 
1985/86, the outcome was r e l a t i v e l y 
unfavourable and basical ly unfair to UK 
beet sugar. The UK t o t a l quota was cut 
by 182 thousand tonnes, reducing i t to 
1.14 mil l ion tonnes. This action was 
based on cer ta in quant i ta t ive c r i t e r i a 
relating to performance in the mid-1970s, 
before BSC had had time to implement i t s 
expansion programme and when beet yields 
in the UK were well below average for 
abnormal climatic reasons. BSC reacted 
by closing four of i t s seventeen factories 
( t hough , g iven i t s m o d e r n i s a t i o n 
programme, retention of a l l i t s factories 
probably would have required an increase 
in quota). 
The cutback in EEC beet sugar quotas from 
a global viewpoint was very reasonable, 
though far from adequate. Reducing the 
UK quota re la t ive ly harshly was far l e s s 
defensible; uni t production costs in the 
UK are arguably lower than in most other 
EEC countries, despite lower beet yields, 
since beet factories in the UK operate on 
average for 120 days per annum compared 
with around 90 days elsewhere in the EEC. 
Although no d i rec t ly comparable figures 
are published re la t ing to costs , the 
cap i ta l - in tens ive nature of the process 
would suggest that within the EEC the UK 
is a relatively low-cost producer. 
In 1985, as the time drew closer for 
fixing EEC quotas for the next production 
period, BS and T&L engaged in a propaganda 
ba t t l e . To date in the 1980s, UK sugar 
usage has s t a b i l i s e d a t around 2.25 
mil l ion tonnes. There are indeed signs 
tha t i t may be on the increase, thanks to 
the very recent introduction of a price 
support scheme which effectively reduces 
t h e c o s t of s u g a r f o r use by 
biotechnological and chemical industries. 
BS made t h i s part of the i r case for an 
increase in quota of some 300 thousand 
tonnes, pointing in addition to the i r 
heal thier production position compared 
with the mid-1970s. T&L took a much 
more cautious stance on potent ia l new 
demand, arguing against any increase in 
beet quotas and presenting themselves as 
champions of the ACP countries whose 
abi l i t ies to export raw cane sugar to the 
EEC could be affected i f e i ther UK cane 
refinery closed. 
At the end of las t year the EEC decided to 
defer the decision on changes in quotas, 
and the 1985/86 quotas were continued for 
two more years. T&L have not, however, 
been content to wait on outside events. 
Their Group expansion programme has 
i n c l u d e d s u s t a i n e d r e s e a r c h i n t o 
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alternative sweeteners, expansion of cane 
sugar i n t e r e s t s in North America, and as 
recently as March 1985 re-entry after 
f i f ty years into sugar beet processing 
when a subsidiary, Western Sugar Co, was 
formed in the US Mid-West to run six beet 
factories. 
THE CURRENT FIGHT FDR BRITISH SUGAR 
BS's parent company, Berisford,ran into 
d i f f i cu l t i e s of i t s own in 1985, part ly 
due to the collapse in the world t i n 
market. Cash flow problems lowered 
Ber i s fo rd ' s share p r i ce and i t has 
subsequently a t t rac ted potential buyers. 
The takeover ba t t l e that has developed 
this year has proceeded as follows: 
February/March The Italian multinational 
Ferruzzi bought 9% of Berisford shares and 
announced that i t s par t icular aim was to 
acquire BS; the r e s t of Be r i s fo rd ' s 
i n t e re s t s would be offered back to the 
Berisford management. Exploratory talks 
with other interested parties such as the 
National Farmers Union produced a poor 
reception for Ferruzzi's proposals and the 
bid was dropped. 
Apri l The UK food and furn i sh ing 
manufacturer Hillsdown Holdings (HH) 
bought a 14.7J stake in Berisford and 
announced an all-paper deal of 9 shares 
for 11 Ber is ford (worth around £430 
mil l ion). Again the intention was to 
hold on pr incipal ly to BS, but also the 
r e s t of Berisford's food i n t e r e s t s , and 
to sell back the remaining interests. T 
& L were forced to respond and on 30 April 
made a part cash/part shares bid for 
Berisford, valued at £478 million. 
May The original MMC report of February 
1981 has argued that if any changes were 
proposed which would fundamentally affect 
the existing market arrangements " i t would 
be desirable for any possible monopoly 
situation to be considered with a view to 
the e s t ab l i shmen t of any necessary 
safeguards in the in t e re s t s of users of 
sugar". I t was clear that T&L's bid i f 
successful would create a strong monopoly 
situation: T&L would control almost 95? 
of the UK market i f i t acquired BS. On 
20 May the Office of Fai r Trading 
announced t h a t both bids were to be 
referred to the MMC. I t would appear to 
have accepted that the HH bid implied the 
sort of change in the existing market 
s t ructure which the MMC in 1981 argued 
ought to be investigated. On 29 May HH 
withdrew i t s bid and subsequently sold i t s 
shares in Berisford to Ferruzzi, whose 
stake rose to 23.7$. 
June/July On 26 June Ferruzzi requested 
that i t s shareholding in Berisford also be 
referred to the MMC, and a week later the 
implicit bid was indeed referred. I t i s 
expected that the enquiry wi l l take a t 
leas t six months, making i t quite l ike ly 
that the outcome will not be known before 
1987. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR GREENOCK 
What are the implications of this takeover 
battle for the future of UK cane refining 
and in particular for Westburn? 
Status quo 
I t i s qui te possible that the MMC w i l l 
recommend that neither bid be allowed to 
proceed. Berisford have in the meantime 
managed to improve t h e i r f i n a n c i a l 
position and seem quite happy now to 
continue to operate BS. 
This effectively leaves Greenock in i t s 
present vulnerable position. There seems 
to be no doubt that Westburn is a marginal 
plant, given i t s small share in t o t a l UK 
cane refining, sustained by i t s locational 
advantage in supplying Scottish consumers. 
I t i s un l ike ly t h a t the small p r i ce 
differential this allows is sufficient to 
cover i t s higher unit production costs and 
in the present circumstances the threat of 
c losure (even i f not s p e c i f i c a l l y 
expressed by T&L) hangs over i t . 
A more ra t ional a t t i tude by the EEC to 
sugar production, bearing in mind i t s 
commitment to the ACP countries, would 
relieve this threat at least in the short-
to medium-term (the next production quota 
period). However, politics and sugar are 
closely linked and, as w i l l be argued 
below, the ACP commitment may in the 
future be maintained in a different way. 
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Tate & Lyle takeover 
I t might appear that the 95% control T&L 
would have of the UK sugar market would 
make i t very d i f f i c u l t for the MMC to 
recommend their bid. However, even with 
t h i s share, T&L's power to se t sugar 
p r i c e s would be l i m i t e d , given the 
sizeable surplus production available in 
France. Indeed the MMC in i t s 1981 
report specif ical ly argued tha t such a 
surplus was a "most important factor 
l imi t ing the price of sugar in Great 
Britain". 
In ea r ly June, p l ans for a major 
reorganisation through merger of the West 
German sugar industry were announced. 
Further rationalisation of European sugar 
seems hard to stop. 
If T&L are permitted to takeover BS th i s 
greatly increases the i r f l e x i b i l i t y in 
respect of operating options. In 1985 
T&L pre-tax prof i t per tonne on UK sugar 
refining was approximately £11 whilst BS 
earned around £50 per tonne. T&L's 
la tes t half-yearly accounts, published at 
the end of April , show that prof i t t h i s 
year on UK cane r e f i n i n g has a lmost 
disappeared, as price competition between 
the two r i va l s stepped up. In these 
circumstances i t seems quite possible that 
T&L might decided t h a t p a r t of a 
rationalisation programme should include 
shutting Westburn. 
Although t h i s would cause problems 
i n i t i a l l y for the EEC's ACP commitment, 
there are a l t e rna t ive p o s s i b i l i t i e s for 
the refining of the ACP cane raws. I t i s 
in te res t ing the T&L have recently bought 
into two cane re f ine r ies in Portugal, 
since Portugal 's accession to the EEC 
introduces a new sugar de f i c i t country 
which has t rad i t iona l ly refined imported 
raw cane sugar. Another option would be 
the process ing of cane raws in beet 
fac tor ies in par t of the i r lengthy off-
season. 
Ferruzzi takeover 
Feruzzi already control much of beet sugar 
refining in I t a ly and the l a rges t sugar 
company, Beghin-Say, in France, giving i t 
18? of the EEC market. I t i s reputedly 
interested in sugar acquisitions in West 
Germany and Spain. The v i t a l question 
for Westburn is how aggressively Ferruzzi 
would compete against T&L. Although 
price competition between BS and T&L has 
been keen, i t does not appear that BS has 
used i t s relatively greater power post-EEC 
entry to launch a sustained at tack on 
T&L's UK cane refining operations. In 
recent years of above-average beet yields, 
BS has exported i t s extra output so as not 
to upset the UK market balance. I t would 
seem less likely that Ferruzzi would be so 
generous. 
Sugar i s , however, a commodity whose 
product ion worldwide i s sub jec t to 
p o l i t i c a l i n t e r f e r e n c e , and i t i s 
d i f f i cu l t to see control of BS being 
allowed to pass onto foreign hands. 
I t i s very open a t t h i s stage whether the 
MMC will recommend that T&L's bid go ahead 
or instead block both bids. In e i ther 
event the future for Westburn seems bleak 
unless the EEC were to take the unlikely 
step of increasing i t s aid to Third World 
countries via a r i s e in the ACP quotas. 
Developments in a l t e rna t ive sweeteners 
seem very l ike ly in the 1990s to reduce 
sugar's share of the market. Even before 
this happens, i t would not take more than 
a further small reduction in the cane 
refining margin to force T&L to cut i t s 
l o s s e s in what was once i t s main 
operation. 
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